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When Billions Meet Trillions: Impact Investing and Shadow Banking in Pakistan 
 
Abstract 
This article argues that impact investing is a means to promote shadow banking. This is 
reflected in the rise of impact investing in Pakistan, particularly its predilection for 
inclusive finance.  Two contentions are made: one, that impact investors fill the void in 
enterprise finance created by regulatory constraints on banks, and two, that impact 
investors accommodate the demand for yield by shepherding global capital into poor 
countries. These contentions augment the finance and development literature which 
critiques the financialized development associated with the Finance for Development 
(FfD) agenda construed by global institutions ostensibly for the Millennium 
Development Goals, or MDGs, of 2015 and subsequently the Sustainable Development 
Goals, or SDGs, of 2030. More recently, the narrative of slogans such as Billions to 
Trillions and the World Bank’s Maximizing Finance for Development agenda, have 
drawn criticism because they advance shadow banking. The case of Pakistan 
exemplifies the traction gained by impact investing as an asset class and the related 
imperative to measure and evaluate outcomes. The resultant focus on base-of-pyramid 
initiatives such as inclusive finance is thus a corollary of the financialization of 
development and the shifts and transformations in development initiatives that 
incorporate private and philanthropic or ‘patient’ capital. 
Keywords 
Development; financialization; impact investing; Pakistan; financial inclusion; shadow 
banking 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade or so, impact investment strategies have entrenched themselves 
simultaneously in the vocabulary of two global communities: development and finance. This 
overlap is a corollary of the Finance for Development (FfD) agenda, pushed by global 
institutions as the ostensible means to attain the targets set for the Millennium Development 
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Goals, or MDGs, of 2015 and subsequently the Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, of 
2030 (UNDP, 2017). More recent iterations of these approaches are reflected in the narrative 
of slogans such as Billions to Trillions and the World Bank’s Maximizing Finance for 
Development agenda, which have drawn criticism for seeking to advance shadow banking. 
This criticism is directed at development strategies that are reliant not only on private capital 
or credit but more specifically on shadow banks which are financial institutions that 
are‘entities and activities fully or partially outside the regular banking system’ (FSB, 2013: p. 
5). 
This paper expands upon those concerns. This is done by highlighting how the 
strategies of international organizations known for emphasizing private sector involvement in 
development, have become increasingly focused on the role of, and need for, financial capital 
from various sources, including public, private, and philanthropic organizations. To 
accommodate this variety, finance for development appears in various forms: these include 
PPPs or public-private partnerships, blended finance, and impact investing strategies. The 
latter is of special interest because of its linkages with philanthropy which has the capacity to 
be a source of patient capital. This is so because impact investing draws on the same 
arguments that fuel the aspirations of individuals and institutions to be philanthrocapitalists 
(Bishop and Green, 2006) by committing ‘patient capital’ to initiatives where other financial 
capitalists fear to tread.  
Both impact investors and philanthrocapitalists assume that their capital will generate 
some degree of financial return, but there are two key differences between impact investing 
and philanthrocapitalism: intent and measurement. These features instill a structural rigor on 
the strategies of impact investors by dictating what can and cannot be regarded as an impact 
investment. These constraints bear relevance for the developmental potential of impact 
investment as they influence how capital is deployed: this argument is made by presenting the 
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origins and transformation of impact investing — an extension of the FfD initiative — and 
then noting how the emphasis on measurement prioritizes base-of-the-pyramid (BoP) 
markets.  
The experience of Pakistan particularly as depicted in the grey literature of the Global 
Impact Investing Network1 or GIIN, development finance institutions, and fund managers, is 
used as the empirical setting to consider the trends and repercussions of impact investment as 
development finance. Among the noteworthy patterns to be observed are the dominance of 
the energy and financial services sectors respectively, which extend BoP approaches to 
investment. Financial services are of particular interest because the impact investment-
microfinance-nexus provides a visible example of the expansionary imperative of global 
finance. Additionally, the data indicates that impact investors prefer deploying capital as debt 
rather than equity. These tendencies are examined here and a theoretical basis for impact 
investing in Pakistan is then offered by invoking arguments from the literature on shadow 
banking.  
A key argument of this paper is that impact investors are effectively shadow banks: 
impact investing is a response to constraints imposed on mainstream banks because of tight 
regulation, including stringent capital requirements, regulatory arbitrage, and additionally it is 
a response to a search for yield from global institutional investors. This second tendency is 
particularly relevant in the Pakistan context where like other shadow banking practices, 
impact investing enables the push for new financial markets, products, techniques, and 
institutions because the demand for investables outstrips supply.  The supply of investables is 
expanded through impact investment funds and their propensity for varying capital structures 
and asset classes. These rely on capital from investors such as pension funds, philanthropic 
foundations, banks, or public sector funders. To attract this capital these investment funds 
create investables in two ways: through debt and through equity.  
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a concise 
overview of the shifts and transformations that have occurred in development initiatives that 
incorporate private and philanthropic capital. Section 3 is a discussion on impact investing as 
an asset class and how the imperative to measure outcomes entails a focus on base-of-
pyramid initiatives. Section 4 examines the role of shadow banking in the financialization of 
development. Section 5 presents the case of impact investing in Pakistan to highlight the 
overlaps between shadow banking and development initiatives. Section 6 concludes.  
2. PPPs, blended finance, and impact investing: origins, transformations, and 
definitions 
Impact investing, as a development strategy, overlaps with slightly older tools, particularly 
blended finance and PPP. For all of these strategies there are multiple definitions. What links 
them is some form of a joint funding structure to cover finance gaps for projects that would 
otherwise be borne fully by either the public or private sector. What separates these strategies 
is perhaps more interesting: whereas PPP strategies, and to a lesser extent but also blended 
capital, are ostensibly designed to enable the public sector to attract private capital, impact 
investing strategies are designed to attract patient capital, usually from governments or 
philanthropists.  
The World Bank (2018) definition of a PPP or public-private partnership is: ‘a long-
term contract between a private party and a government entity, for providing a public asset or 
service, in which the private party bears significant risk and management responsibility, and 
remuneration is linked to performance’. Hodge and Greve (2017) note that there are several 
historical examples of PPP arrangements including toll roads, land reclamation, canals, and 
sanitation projects in Western Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries: since the 1990s however 
PPPs may be considered ‘mainstream’, particularly after receiving the backing of 
international organizations and development agencies including the UNDP and DFID.  
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The mainstreaming of PPPs, also known as 3P or P3, is linked to their popularity with 
governments in the Global South in the 1990s. These strategies sought to replicate the 
experience of advanced capitalist countries — particularly of the Thatcher and Reagan 
regimes — where PPPs had been used extensively in the 1980s for projects of urban 
development (Hodge et al, 2017; Miraftab, 2004). Recent initiatives such as the launch of the 
World Bank PPP Knowledge Lab2 in 2015 and the G20 Global Infrastructure Hub3 in 2014 
have been central to the formation of what Hodge et al. (2017) describe as a new identity for 
PPPs: with a focus on infrastructure and growth, rather on the mode of delivery.  
This emphasis on infrastructure has, to a certain extent, been retained in blended 
finance strategies but tends to weaken when blended finance is explicitly linked to the MDGs 
and SDGs4. Blended finance, according to the OECD (2018), refers to: ‘the strategic use of 
development finance and philanthropic funds to mobilize private capital flows to emerging 
and frontier markets’. Other definitions specifically mention ODA or official development 
assistance5 and grants or ‘grant-equivalent finance’6 and also philanthropy7. Blended finance 
strategies are thus similar to PPPs but move beyond the public and private spheres to involve 
development agencies, international organizations, and also philanthropists.  
In its earlier forms blended finance was oriented to infrastructure projects. This is 
reflected in the examples of various projects lead and supported by the Aga Khan 
Foundation, a faith based organization that operates in over 30, mostly poor, countries and 
generates revenues for reinvestment in further development ventures. The Aga Khan Fund for 
Economic Development (AKFED), through its project companies generates revenues of USD 
4.1 billion with all surpluses reinvested in further development activities (AKDN, 2018b). By 
many accounts, AKFED through the Aga Khan Development Network, or AKDN, has played 
a pioneering role in promoting blended finance for development: this has been done by 
combining the financial capital of its own philanthropic network with resources from vast and 
6 
 
diverse consortia of partners and stakeholders. These include international organizations such 
as the World Bank and the International Financial Corporation,  national governments such as 
Canada and Switzerland, regional development banks such as the African Development Bank 
and the Asian Development Bank, and large financial institutions such as BNP Paribas and 
Blackstone. This strategy is exemplified in a 1980s speech from Prince Karim Aga Khan:  
Bringing together the best what private initiative has to offer from various nations has 
many attractive aspects to developing countries. Individual financial and monetary risk is 
reduced, the sources from which to draw qualified manpower are multiplied and political 
acceptability is increased. Public, or State owned, enterprises can never be a complete 
substitute for private enterprise in building a nation’s economy and in bridging the 
development gap (Aga Khan, 1982, cited in AKDN, 2018a, p. 22).  
There are numerous examples of large projects that have utilized the above approach. Pamir 
Energy which was established in 2002 through the collaboration of the Government of 
Tajikistan and the World Bank, and the Swiss government is an AKDN project that supplies 
clean energy to over a quarter of a million people in eastern Tajikistan and northern 
Afghanistan (European Foundation Centre, 2018). Another example of an infrastructural 
project, also in Afghanistan is that of Roshan, a telecom services provider, which has, since 
its inception in 2003, invested approximately USD 700 million in Afghanistan as the 
country’s single largest private investor: it is also the largest taxpayer, contributing 
approximately five percent of the Afghan government's overall domestic revenue (Roshan, 
2016, p. 3). The company is owned by a consortium of investors, comprising AKFED, 
Monaco Telecom, and the Swedish telecom provider, Telia. Another project in Afghanistan is 
the Government’s National Solidarity Programme (NSP), of which AKDN is a facilitating 
partner and assists in establishing village-based Community Development Councils: this is 
done through an elected, accountable and transparent Council that formulates village 
development plans, and prioritizes village needs.  
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Elsewhere, there are other examples of blended finance as a development tool. These 
include the Bujagali Hydropower Plant, inaugurated in 2012 and built through a public-
private partnership model between the AKFED, Sithe Global Power LLC, an American 
company majority-owned by the private equity fund, Blackstone Capital Partners IV, L.P., 
the International Finance Corporation, the African Development Bank, the European 
Investment Bank and the Government of Uganda. The West Nile Rural Electrification 
Company is another AKFED lead project; a 1.5 MW plant, commissioned in September 
2004, was upgraded in 2012 to boost electricity generating capacity. This was done with the 
support of the Government of Uganda, the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), 
and the World Bank as well as others. The 3.5MW River Nyagak mini hydroelectric plant 
now provides a renewable source of energy to 1.4 million people.  
More recently, initiatives that promote blended finance strategies have come to be 
associated with the SDGS for the year 2030 (OECD, 2017). The roots of this association are 
in the FfD or Financing for Development Agenda that emerged from the United Nations 
International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico in 2002. 
The ensuing Monterrey Consensus was a direct response to the concern that the MDGs 
required immense financial resources: several studies attempted to place a cost on the MDGs, 
with USD 50 billion per annum offered as a commonly cited figure (Clemens et al, 2007). 
The Monterrey Consensus made FDI one of the six pillars of development finance and in the 
process underscored the role of private finance in an FfD or Financing for Development 
agenda.  
In the 16 years since its inception, FfD has been subject to shifts: initially designed for 
MDGs with a target date of 2015, a revised plan was presented in the July of that year at the 
Third International Conference on Financing for Development in Addis Ababa, to 
accommodate the SDGs of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Whereas the 
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United Nations (UN, 2002) estimated that USD 50 billion per annum would be required to 
meet the MDG targets, for the SDGs, the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development or UNCTAD estimates that USD 5 to USD 7 trillion is required overall and this 
indicates that there is an investment gap in developing countries of USD 2.5 trillion 
(UNCTAD, 2016). As Emma Mawdsley observes, previous financing needs for development 
interventions including official development assistance or ODA and also the MDGs have 
been dwarfed in comparison to the targets of the SDGs:  
A variety of MDG-related donor meetings sought to encourage the (so-called) 
‘traditional’ donors to reach their long-standing commitments to provide 0.7% of gross 
national income in ODA. Few donors have ever met this target, and it seems most 
unlikely that the majority ever will under current definitions. As the SDGs coalesced, on 
the other hand, their ambition and scale evidently rendered this 0.7% target grossly 
inadequate. ODA continues to be recognized as an important resource, especially for the 
poorest and/or most conflict-affected countries, but even if every donor met the 0.7% 
target it would barely touch the trillions that have been variously estimated to be required 
to achieve the SDGs. (Mawdsley, 2018: p. 192) 
Whereas the MDG focus was on poverty reduction, the SDG focus appears to be on areas 
such as energy, innovation, and efficiency: investment opportunities in these areas are framed 
as having trickle down effects for poverty reduction (Mawdsley, 2018). This narrative reveals 
a shift: whereas the MDGs were seen as moving the emphasis from poor countries to poor 
people (St. Clair, 2005) and critiqued because ‘to speak of poverty is to postpone speaking of 
development’ (Sindzingre, 2004: p. 176), the SDGs envision a distinct role for the state. Not 
unlike in the past, the state is responsible for supporting the financing of development, but 
unlike in the past, this financing is to be arranged through the collaborative participation of 
public, private, and also philanthropic stakeholders. The importance of philanthropy is 
reflected in the literature of the joint ReDesigning Development Finance Initiative, from the 
World Economic Forum and OECD, which describes blended finance as the ‘strategic use of 
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development finance and philanthropic funds to mobilize private capital for development’ 
(World Economic Forum, 2015, p. 3). 
The attention directed to philanthropy for its potential to supplement FfD and to 
advance blended finance strategies has driven the institutionalization of philanthrocapitalism. 
The contribution of the Rockefeller Foundation has been substantial in highlighting the nexus 
between finance and philanthropy which produced the concept of impact investing. The term 
‘impact investing’ was coined in 2007 at the Foundation’s Bellagio Center, ‘putting a name 
to investments made with the intention of generating both financial return and social and/or 
environmental impact’ (Rockefeller Foundation, 2018). A focal point for the Rockefeller 
Foundation is ‘innovative finance’, described as ‘Private Capital for the Public Good’ 
(Keohane and Madsbjerg, 2016). Innovative finance is an approach to channel private money 
from global financial markets by using ‘philanthropic risk capital’ (Rockefeller Foundation, 
2018).  
This approach underlies the presentation of impact investing as a new asset class that 
offers a double bottom line: market returns and social good (JP Morgan, 2010). In its annual 
Global Family Office Report, the Swiss based bank UBS observed that as family offices of 
high net worth individuals are taken over by younger — millennial — generations, the 
demand for profitable investments which also seek to address environmental and social issues 
has grown (UBS, 2017). Additionally, another instance of the mainstreaming of impact 
investment is in the endorsement by the Vatican: Pope Francis convened a landmark 
conference on impact investing in 2014 and this was followed by subsequent conferences in 
2016 and 2018: 
…to share and evaluate blended finance models and investible vehicles to address 
systemic challenges of great importance to both the Catholic Church and the global 
community: Climate Change, Health, Migrants and Refugees, and Youth 
Unemployment. (Vatican Impact Investing Conference, 2018, p. 1) 
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Is there then an overlap between blended finance and impact investments? The latter 
are described as ‘investments made into companies, organizations, and funds with the 
intention to generate social and environmental impact alongside a financial return’ (GIIN, 
2018):  given this definition the concept of impact investment shares commonalities with 
blended finance strategies which are formulated to advance developmental goals. The key 
difference that sets them apart is this: blended finance is a strategy whereas impact 
investment is an asset class.  
The salience of this distinction is reflected in the definition of the Global Impact 
Investment Network, which is comprised of various international development agencies and 
large investment banks, and which portrays impact investing as an instrument rather than a 
practice. Additionally, when impact investing is presented as an asset class, the role of 
financial practices and instruments such as de-risking and patient capital, exemplify 
contemporary manifestations of development and finance. Moreover, the position of impact 
investment as an asset class also relates to the need for evaluation: in this case based on the 
metrics of intent and measurement. 
 
3. Impact investing as a new asset class 
The positioning of impact investing as an asset class connects the practices of 
philanthrocapitalism and shadow banking. Impact investing has led to the production of 
financial instruments that are offered by asset managers to attract capital from 
philanthropists: impact investments thus link shadow bankers8 to philanthrocapitalists.  
The Financial Times defines an asset class as a broad group of securities or 
investments that tend to react similarly in different market conditions: the three basic asset 
classes are equity securities (stocks), fixed-income securities (bonds), and cash equivalents 
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(money market vehicles) but the consideration is often expanded to include real estate, 
commodities and derivatives (Financial Times, 2017).  
The notion that impact investments are a separate and new asset class9 has much to do 
with risk and return. Whereas the other asset classes, mentioned above, are evaluated in terms 
of how much they return relative to the risk they entail10, impact investments look beyond 
return in a purely financial sense and seek to achieve non-financial goals even when this 
compromises financial profitability. The attainment of these goals is made possible by patient 
capital and measurement techniques geared to evaluating social and environmental outcomes.  
Patient capital is a means to draw investors to risky but socially desirable projects. 
Deeg and Hardie (2016) describe it as: ‘equity or debt whose providers aim to capture 
benefits specific to long-term investments and who maintain their investment even in the face 
of adverse short-term conditions for the firm’. As such, it is a means to de-risk financial 
capital and to thus crowd in more investment. The need for patient capital entails the 
involvement of actors — including, but also from outside of the public sector — willing to 
accept below market returns for investments. This aligns closely with what Bishop and Green 
(2006) call ‘philanthrocapitalism’, an approach to altruism which is the core of the 
‘philanthropy-finance-development complex’ (Stolz and Lai, 2018; Gabor and Brooks, 2017; 
Mawdsley, 2015). Below market returns are an alternative to risk-based pricing because they 
ensue from investments that seek a double bottom line: this is the difference between risk 
capital and patient capital11. Patient capital encompasses financial gain as well as positive 
social and environmental outcomes, otherwise known as ‘impact’. While the objectives of 
such investments are diverse, some outcomes are more conducive to measurement than 
others. Table 1 presents illustrative examples of measurable outcomes, showing how projects 
that have a focus on numbers of individuals — such as financial services, education, or 
energy — are more conducive to being measured and reported.  
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Table 1: Illustrative Examples of Measurable Social or Environmental 
Outcomes 
Agriculture Increase in productivity or crop yield as a result of improved technology or 
training 
Education Participation rates of girls in secondary education in sub-Saharan Africa 
Energy Number of individuals at the base of the pyramid who gain access to electricity 
Environment Tons of CO2, equivalent offset as a result of organization’s product or service 
Financial 
Services 
Number of micro-insurance products sold to people with AIDS and infected with 
HIV 
Health Readmission rate of diabetes patients using innovative product for monitoring 
health 
Housing Reduction in the rate of homelessness among major US cities 
Source: World Economic Forum (2013, p. 7) 
These social and environmental outcomes are the subject of a range of measurement 
techniques. Commitments to measure impact, along with expectations of returns, and the 
intent to have a positive social impact are the three features that set an impact investment 
apart from forms of investment (UNDP, 2017). This focus on measurement subjects this 
developmental approach to a level of standardization that is unprecedented in global 
development, albeit not in finance. The three key tools for measuring impact are IRIS, 
PULSE, and GIIRS. They are outlined in Table 2, which are likened to tools used by 
commercial investors, such as the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (Financial 
Reporting Council, 2013) and credit rating tools such as Moody’s.  
Table 2: Key tools for measuring impact 
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Tool Description Institutional background 
IRIS 
(Impact Reporti
ng and 
Investment 
Standards) 
Taxonomy or set of terms 
with standardized 
definitions that governs the 
way companies, investors, 
and others define their 
social and environmental 
performance.  
Sponsored by The Rockefeller Foundation, Acumen 
and the B Lab to create common metrics for 
reporting the performance of impact capital. Since 
2009, IRIS has been housed at the Global Impact 
Investing Network. It incorporates sector-specific 
best practices and reports major trends across the 
impact investing industry. 
B Analytics Customizable platform that 
various players in the 
impact space use for 
measuring, benchmarking 
and reporting on impact. 
Acumen developed PULSE in 2006 as a software that 
enables impact investors to collect, manage and 
report on the impact of their investees: PULSE was 
incorporated into B Analytics in 2013 turning it into 
a fully integrated data and technology platform for 
investors to measure their impact of their portfolios.  
GIIRS (Global 
Impact 
Investment 
Ratings System) 
Impact ratings tool and 
analytics platform that 
assesses companies and 
funds on the basis of their 
social and environmental 
performance. Based on 
IRIS definitions; generates 
data that feed industry 
benchmark reports. 
Developed by B Lab and launched in 2011 to 
manage, benchmark and assess the social and 
environmental impact of developed and emerging 
market companies, portfolios, and funds. Uses a 
ratings and analytics approach based on a broad 
universe of impact data. Data is self-reported by 
companies and reviewed by a third-party verification 
service provider, Deloitte before a company can 
receive a rating.  
Sources: Compiled by author, based on Acumen (2018); Brandenburg (2012). 
These tools are employed across various geographies including the Global South as well as 
advanced capitalist countries. However, in the context of development IRIS is of particular 
interest because of its capacity to frame investment strategies. In doing so it facilitates a form 
of ‘social closure’ (Palan, 1999): Heloise Weber describes this as a form of governance that 
‘pushes questions of social and political struggle away from the realm of the public sphere’ 
(2004, p. 361). Particularly worrying is the predilection of IRIS for the narrative of BoP or 
base-of-pyramid initiatives which are the subject of C.K Prahalad’s immensely successful 
2004 book: The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty Through Profits.  
BoP strategies for reducing poverty rest on the assumption that poor people, who 
make up a substantial chunk of the world’s population, offer immense potential as customers 
of products and services that can meet their specific needs (Prahalad, 2005). Microfinance 
and mobile banking are examples of such products and services, as are singularly packaged 
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toiletries and alcohol: such strategies have been criticized however for exploiting ‘poor 
people’s vulnerabilities, such as their lack of education and their desire for cheap relief from 
chronic distress’ and also for under-emphasizing the state’s role and responsibility in poverty 
reduction (Karnani, 2009). Such critiques problematize the impact investing industry’s hefty 
emphasis on financial services as shown in Table 3. In particular, the BoP bent of IRIS is 
strongly reflected in the manner in which outcomes are measured: very often the unit of 
analysis is either individuals or products consumed. This is reflected in the heavy presence of 
impact enterprises operating in the financial services sector: these measure impact, for 
instance, in terms of number of micro-insurance products sold or number of persons or 
number of women who accessed financial services. Data gathered by the Global Investment 
Impact Network (GIIN) for 2013 shows that 73% of impact enterprises, 2,707 in number, 
were in the financial services: data for 2015 shows a decrease in percentage and but a rise in 
absolute terms with financial services organizations making up a percentage of 63% of the 
total despite growing to 2,949 in total. This can be ascribed to the rise in the number of 
organizations described as ‘other’ or ‘technical assistance’. The latter might indicate a sharp 
increase in the number of consulting or advisory organizations operating in the impact 
investment sphere: in 2013 there were only 4 reporting organizations worldwide that were 
classified as technical assistance, whereas in 2015, there were 158, of these, 139 were based 
in North America.  
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Table 2: Number of impact investment enterprises by region and sector12
   East 
Asia and 
Pacific 
Sub 
Saharan 
Africa 
South 
Asia 
Europe 
and 
Central 
Asia 
Latin 
America 
and the 
Caribbean 
North 
America 
Middle 
East and 
North 
Africa 
Total 
Agriculture 18 141 14 17 293 34 3 520 
Artisanal 4 .. 3 4 14 8 0 33 
Culture 0 0 0 .. 15 11 .. 26 
Education .. 0 .. .. 5 34 0 39 
Energy 48 32 14 3 17 9 0 123 
Environment .. 0 0 .. 9 48 0 57 
Financial 
Services 
361 598 406 443 518 542 81 2949 
Health 3 10 8 4 21 27 .. 73 
Housing 
Development 
0 .. 5 .. 5 31 0 41 
ICT 11 46 16 8 50 64 4 199 
Infrastructure/ 
Facilities 
.. 0 .. .. 7 0 0 7 
Other 12 12 30 14 104 51 9 232 
Supply Chain 4 .. 3 .. 12 78 0 97 
Technical 
Assistance 
.. 0 .. 4 15 139 0 158 
Tourism .. 0 0 4 4 9 0 13 
Water 3 .. .. 0 .. 4   7 
Total 472 844 505 510 1091 1089 100 4611 
 
Source: GIIN (2014, p. 2) 
 
4. Financial logic and the role of shadow banking in development 
The BoP focus of impact investing, through financial services may be attributed to what 
Emma Mawdsley calls ‘deepening financial logics in development narratives, institutional 
functioning, programmatic interventions and stakeholder subjectivities’ (Mawdsley, 2018: p. 
194). In adopting such approaches, impact investing has left its strategies open to the 
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development critiques of BoP financial services, or more specifically, those directed at 
microfinance and financial inclusion. Whereas older critiques contain themes such as (1) the 
questionable relationship between microfinance and poverty reduction (Duvendack et al, 
2011; Dichter and Harper, 2007), (2) the validity of claims that microfinance enhances 
gender empowerment (Karim, 2008) and social capital (Rankin, 2002), and (3) the 
commercialisation of lending (Bateman and Chang, 2012; Sinclair, 2012) the more recent 
literature interrogates financial inclusion — the successor paradigm to microfinance — in the 
context of global financial circuits (Mader, 2018; 2015; Soederberg, 2014; 2013; 2012; Roy, 
2010; Aitken, 2010). This latter set of scholarship places a particular emphasis on the 
institutions responsible for endorsing and cementing linkages between financial inclusion and 
global financial markets13.   
The ascendancy of financial logic has also been the subject of concern in an emergent 
literature about the encroachment of the financial sector into development.  For instance, 
Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge (2018) point to a recent revival in PPPs to exemplify this 
encroachment. They observe that past efforts such as those in 1990s — involving the World 
Bank and also regional development banks — to enlist the private sector in development 
initiatives were driven by a narrative of efficiency gains through privatization. But, current 
approaches present PPPs as an opportunity to utilize financial capital given ‘a glut in global 
savings’ (Bayliss and Van Waeyenberge, 2018: p. 578). Mawdsley (2018a) notes that 
mainstream development models seek to deepen and expand financial markets and logics and 
that this is exemplified thus: in the shift from foreign aid to development finance, and also in 
the nature of the macro-micro linkages between financial circuits in interventions such as 
microfinance which extend the reach of financial technology and capital.  Additional 
examples of the ‘acceleration and deepening of the financialization-development nexus’ 
(Mawdsley, 2018a: p. 265) are to be found in what Gabor and Brooks (2017) call the ‘digital 
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revolution in financial inclusion’ which seeks to turn poor households into generators of 
financial assets.  
More recently, in early October 2018, in an open letter14 circulated online, scholars of 
development and finance in the Global South expressed deep concern about the efforts of 
international organizations, including the World Bank, to bring shadow banking into 
development. Pointing to the narrative presented in assemblages such as Billions to 
Trillion15s and the World Bank’s Maximizing Finance for Development16 agenda, the authors 
of this letter assert that such strategies promote shadow banking by advancing securitization 
practices in which institutions such as the World Bank bundle various loans and then issue 
tranches to float in global capital markets. Additionally, by calling on poor countries to attract 
global financial capital, such strategies fixate on enhancing liquidity in local capital markets 
through instruments such as repos and derivatives. These practices are troublesome because 
they tend to — as demonstrated in the 2007-2009 global financial crisis — expose markets to 
macroeconomic instability.   
Shadow banking, financial innovation, and the financialization of FfD 
These concerns are reflected in the political economy literature on finance and development 
which contains two contrasting perspectives. One of these is the mainstream economics 
approach. Represented by development strategies based on FfD or finance for development 
strategies which portray development constraints as an issue of finance, this proposes 
remedies by mobilising capital through various combinations of public and private sources 
(Hudson, 2015; UN, 2002). 
The alternative, political economy approach relies on heterodox critiques of 
excessively liberalised and insufficiently regulated financial markets: this is covered in the 
stream of literature on financialization which draws on Minksyian hypotheses of ‘money 
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manager capitalism’ (Minsky, 1996; Wray, 2009). Given the low-yield environment that has 
prevailed since the 1990s, financiers have sought to advance financial innovation to meet the 
growing demand for investment: the alternative would be to ensure that only stable and sound 
financial assets are created and traded but this would limit earnings and profitability 
(Nesvetailova, 2017).   
Financial innovation, as a symptom of broader processes of financialization is borne 
out in the subjugation of the impact investing paradigm by the shadow banking industry: this 
has resulted in the creation of debt instruments of various shapes and forms. The idea that 
shadow banking has a context in the Global South is of course not a novel one, but the 
concerns highlighted above are a departure from  earlier literature that has tended to see it — 
particularly in the growth of nonbanking financial companies — as a response to the 
regulatory and institutional constraints in some poor countries. 
General examples of this are available in Ghosh et al (2012) where shadow banks are 
discussed as sources of alternative funding and in Lyman et al (2015) where systemic risks 
from inclusive finance are considered though eventually downplayed. Other examples, which 
are more detailed, use a specific country context to demonstrate how shadow banking 
emerges from institutional constraints. For instance Acharya et al (2013) observe that the 
lending activities of nonbank financial institutions in India fill gaps when mainstream or 
commercial banks are constrained in disbursing credit because of prudential regulation and 
other government policies. Kaurova (2017) notes that in Russia, where there is a gulf between 
the financial economy and the ‘real’ economy, domestic capital markets offer only weak 
financial access to corporations which then seek alternative funding and risk insurance 
mechanisms. For China, Knack and Gruiin (2017) find that the state backs inclusive finance, 
particularly digital or internet finance, as a response to global regulatory curbs on financial 
institutions.   
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These are instances of the view that shadow banking has a ‘supply side’ explanation 
as it is caused by market players seeking regulatory arbitrage and regulatory avoidance. 
Support in the literature for this supply side view rests on the notion that shadow banks 
emerge because regulation is stifling (Tett, 2009; Chick, 2008), and also the concept that 
shadow banks emerge because of the political influence of ‘greedy’ financiers (Pagliari, 
2013; Erturk and Solari, 2007). Another and somewhat more current view holds that shadow 
banking has a ‘demand side’ explanation because the global financial system has reached the 
limits of natural growth so financial innovation is employed to allow continued expansion 
(Nesvetailova, 2017). This is a departure from a regulatory arbitrage focus and thus the 
supply side approach, which has also been called the ‘viable credit alternative’ view given the 
argument that non bank finance is a substitute for mainstream finance (Gabor, 2018: p. 395). 
Both views of shadow banking are recurrent features in the literature on 
financialization, but the latter, demand side view has enhanced insights on how the FfD 
agenda has itself become financialized and how institutions responsible for advancing this 
agenda behave like shadow banks. The demand side view acknowledges not only the 
influence of the global financial market in domestic shadow banking, but also the discursive 
transformation that Daniela Gabor describes as a shift from shadow banking to market-based 
finance and which reflects a ‘renewed global push, led by Germany in the G20, to extend the 
reach of financialized globalization’ (Gabor, 2018: p. 398). Thus, it is not just regulatory 
constraints but also a search for yield from global investors that has resulted in the rapid 
growth of alternatives to mainstream or traditional banking. The demand side perspective is 
that new financial markets, products, techniques, and institutions are created because the 
demand for investables outstrips supply: impact investing plays a role in this process of 
creation because it responds to unfulfilled demand by expanding the supply of investables. 
This is done by impact investment funds with varying capital structures that rely on capital 
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from investors such as pension funds, foundations, banks, or public sector funders. To attract 
this capital these investment funds create investables in two ways: through debt and through 
equity.  
Recent survey data from GIIN (2018) indicates that private debt, often in the form of 
fixed income is, responsible for 34% of the assets under management in the impact investing 
industry; this is followed by real assets — for instance infrastructure, real estate, and 
commodities — at 22%; and private equity — through which investment funds acquire 
shareholding and ownership stakes in companies — at 19%. These investables are 
incorporated into the strategies and portfolios of the some of the largest financial institutions. 
For instance, the 2015 acquisition of Imprint Capital Advisors, an 18 person San Francisco 
based impact investment fund, by Goldman Sachs was an indication for the Wall Street 
financial community that client demand for impact investments is substantial (Bloomberg, 
2015).  
Another instance of Wall Street engagement with impact investing is to be found in 
the Global Impact fund launched in 2018 and managed by KKR, the New York based private 
equity firm which manages over USD 190 billion17. For global financial institutions, 
acquiring or establishing a fund that dedicated to impact investing is often a means to 
overcome size constraints: poor countries have shallow markets so investment opportunities, 
even when lucrative, tend to be too small to attract financial capital in the large tranches that 
are customary for global fund managers. The FfD agenda has to an extent overcome this 
problem and connected small impact investment funds with large global financial institutions 
through initiatives such as the PRI or United Nations Principles on Responsible Investment. 
By asking financial institutions to become signatories, the PRI generates explicit 
commitments to report on responsible investment activities annually; the current list of 
signatories currently exceeds two thousand (PRI, 2018).  
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In addition to global financial institutions, impact investment funds receive capital 
from development finance institutions. For instance, the United Kingdom’s DFID, through its 
investment company the CDC or Commonwealth Development Corporation, has been 
deploying capital in impact investment funds since 2012: this is been done directly, as in 
establishment of the CDC managed Impact Fund, and also indirectly such as in the 
investments made by the Impact Fund into other funds focused on Africa, and Asia (The 
Impact Programme, 2018). Another instance which reflects a somewhat different 
arrangement is the Microfinance Initiative for Asia (MIFA) Debt Fund. This was established 
in 2012 by Germany’s Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), 
Germany’s development bank (KfW), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and is 
managed by a privately owned, Swiss based, impact investment firm (OECD, 2018).   
There are thus investments made in impact investment funds, such as those by global 
financial institutions and by development finance institutions; and there are investments made 
by impact investment funds, such as those in BoP initiatives for financial services. The onus 
of meeting the requirements of metrics such as IRIS fall on the latter whereas the deployment 
of capital, either in the form or debt or equity, is in the hands of the former. The next section 
discusses how this arrangement has shaped development and finance in Pakistan.  
5. Impact investing and shadow banking in Pakistan 
The relationship between impact investing and shadow banking in Pakistan is reflected in two 
trends that have occurred in the country. One of these is the growing interconnectivity 
between microfinance and global capital: this is discussed below in the context of how 
microfinance lenders have been enabled — domestically and also internationally — in 
seeking wholesale funding, first from the World Bank, and then through other investors such 
as British and German development finance institutions.  This is related to the second trend of 
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how development finance institutions, with a preference for credit based investment or debt 
instruments, dominate the impact investing landscape in terms of capital deployed. These 
trends may be seen in the light of the two explanations of shadow banking presented above: 
supply side and demand side. 
Impact investing though microfinance in Pakistan has a context in the wider financial 
landscape of the country: this is comprised of commercial banks18, development finance 
institutions19, and microfinance banks, all of which are regulated by the State Bank of 
Pakistan or SBP20. Studies on Pakistani banking and finance tend to make a sharp distinction 
between the pre-1990s and post-1990s financial system given the upheaval associated with 
the IMF structural adjustment program that commenced in 1988 (Naqvi, 2018; Zaidi, 2015; 
Sayeed and Abbasi, 2015). Pre-1990s Pakistan had the financial system of a developmental 
state in which nationalized financial institutions were directed to allocate credit to designated 
sectors (Naqvi, 2018). The financial and trade liberalization reforms that were undertaken as 
a part of structural adjustment thus sought to address what was characterized as a repressed 
financial system21, the main criticisms of which were that excessive, inefficient, and corrupt 
lending practices were draining government finances and causing high percentages of non-
performing loans (Naqvi, 2018). As a result of liberalization, numerous domestic and foreign 
banks began operations in Pakistan and the government divested ownership in publicly 
owned banks. Reforms also entailed the removal of interest rate ceilings, work on 
mechanisms to determine a market rate of interest (Hanif, 2002), and the closure of over 2000 
bank branches over a 6 year period (Burki and Ahmad, 2010).  The same environment of 
reform that resulted in a closely regulated commercial banking sector was also the setting in 
which microfinance was incorporated into the financial landscape. During the late 1990s the 
government of Pakistan, with a loan from the Asian Development Bank sought to provide 
regulated microfinance services by asking commercial banks to acquire stakes in a newly 
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established microfinance institution. The Khushhali Bank Ordinance was specially passed in 
2000 to support the creation of Khushhali Bank under the Asian Development Bank’s 
Microfinance Sector Development Program and also the Government of Pakistan’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy (ADB, 2008). The Microfinance Institutions Ordinance 2001, and also 
prudential regulations for microfinance banks, were subsequently introduced to specifically 
deal with the incorporation, regulation and supervision of microfinance banks in Pakistan 
(ADB, 2008).  
Official support for microfinance is expressed in the country’s PRSP or Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers. These documents are a part of the IMF’s late 1990s strategy to 
target poverty reduction through more participatory approaches which required countries to 
prepare regular reports — updated every three years or so — in collaboration with various 
stakeholders and partners, including the World Bank and IMF (IMF, 2004). The Government 
of Pakistan released an initial or ‘I-PRSP’ in late 2000 and a full PRSP in 2003 (IMF, 2004). 
Of especial relevance in the strategies articulated thus is the role of the World Bank 
sponsored Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund which was established in the year 2000 as a 
special purpose vehicle designed to channel funding to broad based programs in community 
physical infrastructure and capacity building interventions, as well as microfinance: as such it 
came to function as the country’s apex fund or what CGAP (2002) describes as ‘a second-tier 
or wholesale organization that channels funding (grants, loans, guarantees) to multiple 
microfinance institution (MFIs) in single country or region’.  
Eventually, as microfinance and financial inclusion became increasingly embedded in 
the strategies of the central bank of the Ministry of Finance (NFIS, 2015), the microfinance 
lending portfolio of the PPAF was shifted to a newly established private sector investment 
company: the Pakistan Microfinance Investment Company or PMIC.  The establishment of 
the PMIC opened a sizeable channel connecting the domestic microfinance industry to global 
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fund managers. This is so because of the ownership structure of this institution: 49% by the 
PPAF, 38% by Karandaaz, and 13% by Germany’s state owned KfW. The role of these 
shareholders is to connect microfinance lenders in Pakistan with global capital markets as 
well as international donors. The PPAF, for instance is funded by multiple donors including 
the Government of Pakistan, the World Bank, DFID, and KfW. 
The company structure of Karandaaz is a revealing example of an impact investing 
institution that is described both as a nonprofit company22 and a special purpose vehicle23 
(GOV.UK, 2014) focused on promoting access to finance for small and medium enterprises 
and financial inclusion (Karandaaz, 2018). This organization was set up by DFID ‘to 
strengthen the microfinance industry, entrepreneurship and small business development in 
Pakistan by working with existing institutions and through innovative financial products’ 
(GOV.UK, 2014: p. 3) and is legally equipped as a special purpose vehicle to participate in 
various financial instruments: equity, quasi-equity, debt, guarantees and other instruments for 
providing capital to small, medium, and microfinance enterprises.   
Microfinance lenders had in the past been partially24 reliant on World Bank 
disbursements to the PPAF. But they could now seek funds — in the form of wholesale 
structured credit and equity-linked direct capital investments —from the PMIC which had 
additional backing from a major development agency, and also from an impact investing fund 
sponsored by DFID as well the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Karandaaz, 2018).   
The importance of development finance institutions such as KfW and DFID is 
mentioned in the reports of the Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN), which is the key 
source of data on such initiatives particularly in South Asia. Within such reports Pakistan is 
described as one of the largest impact investment landscapes in the region, with close to a 
total of USD 2 billion deployed: most of this is by institutional investors — mainly DFIs — 
but there is also considerable investment from high net worth individuals (HNWIs) (GIIN, 
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2014). This includes impact investors as well as ‘impact related investors’: the latter are a 
separate category because despite being involved in activities that are much like impact 
investing, there is an absence of an explicit impact intention. A view from many fund 
managers that impact is achieved by default through their activities — whether this means 
increased access to capital where there was less before, or impact through investment in 
sectors like agriculture, which will affect farmer incomes, even without this being intentional 
ex ante (GIIN, 2014, p. 12). There is an understanding that such institutions are poised to act 
as intermediaries for the deployment of impact capital and as such have either expressed 
interest in or are in the process of developing a metric based approach to measuring and 
reporting impact (GIIN, 2014). Additionally, there are several foundations as well as family 
offices of HNWIs, which are not impact investors as they tend to have either purely 
philanthropic or commercial objectives but are nevertheless relevant in the broader landscape 
as they have the potential to offer a large pool of domestic capital (GIIN, 2014).  
These observations capture the presence of a large number of social enterprises in 
Pakistan that resist the classification of impact enterprises, primarily because they pre-date 
the rise of FfD and the formal conceptualization of impact investing25. GIIN (2014) analysis 
indicates that such activity accounts for a small share of the overall impact investment 
landscape: impact-related investors deployed capital of approximately USD 481 million 
relative to the nearly USD 2 billion deployed by impact investors. The former category 
consists of an unconfirmed number of angel investors: some of these are tied to incubators 
and accelerators whereas others operate more informally. The latter category refers to 18 
impact investors identified by GIIN (2014): these are constituted by 11 DFIs as well as nine 
funds with a venture capital or private equity strategy that incorporates social impact.  
This mixed structure reflects gradual changes that have occurred since the late 1990s, 
when Ashoka, a USA based organization that ‘identifies and supports the world’s leading 
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social entrepreneurs, learns from the patterns in their innovations, and mobilizes a global 
community to embrace these new frameworks and build an “everyone a changemaker” 
world’26 recruited its first fellows in Pakistan in 1997; this was followed by the arrival of the 
Acumen Fund in 200227 and subsequently by the Karachi based SEED (Social, 
Entrepreneurship and Equity Development) fund established in 2009 to offer investment, 
incubation and entrepreneurial services for ‘societal and economic change’28. These early 
participants played a significant role in highlighting the developmental significance of 
‘patient’ or philanthropic capital (Acumen, 2018). They are also seen as key players in the 
social enterprise industry (Ali and Darko, 2015). This reputation belies their relative 
contribution in terms of monetary value: to date, the Acumen Fund has invested USD 16 
million in Pakistan since 2002 (Acumen, 2018), whereas SEED has invested just under USD 
0.65 million since 2009 (Seed Ventures, 2018). This may be compared to the USD 157 
million that the CDC — the development finance arm of DFID — has invested since it first 
entered the Pakistan marker in 2015 (CDC Group, 2015).  
The CDC’s approach here typifies that of DFIs in terms of sectoral focus; of the USD 
157 million, USD 122 million was invested in financial services and USD 32 million d in 
energy (CDC, 2015). It is notable that the CDC investment in financial services consisted of a 
5% direct equity stake in HBL, which is Pakistan’s largest commercial bank and controlled 
by the Aga Khan Fund for Economic Development or AKFED29, which holds a 51% stake in 
the institution. The AKFED, through HBL, also owns one of the largest and oldest 
microfinance banks in Pakistan, FMFB or First Micro Finance Bank: through this subsidiary 
organization, the CDC’s share in HBL allows it to ‘help people on low incomes access 
potentially life-changing financial services such as micro-credit to start or grow a small 
business’ (CDC, 2015: p. 4).  
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Like the CDC, Proparco, the private sector financing arm of Agence Française de 
Développement has invested USD 20 million30 in wind energy, USD 21 million31 for a gas 
fired power plant, and USD 5 million32 in financial services. Other DFIs involved in energy 
and finance in Pakistan are the Norwegian Norfund, which has a Pakistan allocation of 3% of 
a USD 42 million investment fund to concentrate on micro-financing institutions. And as 
mentioned earlier, KfW, the German development bank has provided finance for various 
sectors in Pakistan including energy and health and also owns 13%33 of the Pakistan 
Microfinance Investment Company, the apex fund for microfinance in the country. 
This interest in financial services, primarily microfinance, is captured in GIIN (2014) 
data which indicates that financial services received USD 213 million of the capital deployed 
by both DFIs and non DFIs whereas the energy sector received approximately USD 624 
million. The dominance of energy here is directly related to the acute power shortage that 
Pakistan has faced, particularly over the last decade (Haque, 2017), and also to the proclivity 
of this sector to absorb ‘large ticket size investments that align with DFI mandates’ (GIIN, 
2014, p. 19). This is partially so because Pakistan’s energy sector has since the reforms of the 
1990s been geared towards attracting private investment. This has been done by ensuring that 
the independent producers of electrical power receive a fixed return (IRR) on their 
investment and are also reimbursed for all direct “pass through” costs/expenses incurred in 
power generation (Shaikh et al, 2015). 
Such arrangements underlie the preference of impact investors for debt over equity: 
most impact capital, approximately USD 1.3 billion of nearly USD 2 billion, has been 
deployed in Pakistan through debt (GIIN, 2014). This is noteworthy because impact investing 
tends to be associated with private equity and venture capital approaches: these imply that the 
investor acquires a stake in the enterprise. However, recent data on global trends in impact 
investing shows that private debt is the biggest asset class now for impact investments and 
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that a large chunk of investments in developing and emerging markets are via PDIF or private 
debt impact funds (Forbes, 2018). 
 
Table 3: Impact investing amounts deployed in Pakistan to date 
USD 
Million 
DFI Non DFI Total 
Equity  153 26 179 
Debt 1189 127 1316 
Total34 1830 162  
Source: GIIN (2014) 
 
The focus on debt in Pakistan is largely driven by DFIs with relatively low risk appetites. 
Debt instruments require a lower level of due diligence relative to equity investments, and 
also demand less post-investment management. Even though non-DFI impact investors tend 
to invest a greater percentage of capital in equity than DFIs — 16% versus 7.3% for DFIs — 
the partiality to debt rather than equity still prevails (GIIN, 2014). Though not clear from the 
GIIN (2014) study, there appears to be an overlap between the activities of DFIs and 
investment funds. For instance the Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing 
Countries invests in microfinance through its NMI Global Fund which in turn invests in a 
number of investment funds focused on microfinance: earlier data shows that NMI Global 
Fund has a 3% allocation for Pakistan (Norfund, 2018). Similarly, the DFID Impact Fund 
invests in Pakistan through the Singapore based Insitor Impact Asia Fund, which uses DFID 
capital for stakes in early and growth stage companies across South Asia. Another instance is 
USAID’s Pakistan Private Investment Initiative is comprised of three professionally managed 
investment funds: the Abraaj Pakistan Fund, the Pakistan Catalyst Fund, and the Boltoro 
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Growth Fund (USAID, 2018). 
Given the case of Pakistan, there are two arguments for applying a shadow banking 
lens to impact investing. One of these operates on the ‘crowding out’ assumption of bank 
finance and, more specifically, on the low ratio of private credit to GDP. The central bank 
notes for instance that the total assets and deposits of the country’s banking sector have 
doubled since 2008, but private sector credit to GDP has declined from 22% in 2009 to just 
14.7% in June 2014. The decline in credit provided to SMEs has been particularly 
pronounced, falling from 16% of bank lending in 2008 to 7% in 2014 (SBP, 2015). Fiscal 
patterns come across as the underlying cause of why commercial banks in Pakistan have been 
so lax in widening their customer base: the low tax base, at less than 11% of GDP, compels 
the government to rely on borrowing for deficit funding (Ministry of Finance, 2017). Private 
businesses account for 40% of bank credit, and only 0.4% of all borrowers are responsible for 
65% of all bank loans (SBP, 2015). 
 In the absence of effective measures to widen and also to deepen the tax base, it is 
unlikely that commercial banks, which are currently earning heavy spreads by investing in 
risk free treasury bills, will shift their focus away from the government and large corporate to 
the lower income segments of the non corporate private sector. The ‘Dominant Borrower 
Syndrome’ in which persistent government borrowing from commercial banks has limited the 
sector is interrogated by Choudhary et al. (2016). The widening of interest rate spreads, lower 
private sector credit, despite a policy rate that has fallen by over 550 basis points over four 
years, and a weak transmission of monetary policy have been created by lack of impetus for 
credit intermediation, given an ample supply of zero-risk weighted assets in the form of 
government paper.  
This explanation, which rests on the macroeconomic assumption of crowding out, is, 
however, simplistic. Stringent capital requirements, as necessitated by the Basel framework, 
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deterred banks from lending to the private sector, especially where high default risk was a 
feature of incomplete collateral and/or uncertain cash flows: this is an empirically 
documented tendency discussed in a shadow banking concept by Toporowski (2017). Also 
noteworthy here is the relationship between government borrowing and banking spreads. In 
developing economies the state tends to be insensitive to the cost of borrowing in order to 
finance its budget deficit when it has no recourse to other sources: this is an outcome of a 
shallow secondary market for lending, suggesting the need for policies to enhance domestic 
debt markets alongside liberal reforms (Choudhary et al., 2016). 
The above argument is thus akin to the supply side perspective of shadow banking 
which connects the emergence and growth of shadow banking to regulation and policy 
(Nesvetailova, 2017), and is empirically expressed in the role of impact investors in meeting 
the credit needs of enterprises excluded from the traditional banking sector. A second 
argument builds on the demand side view of shadow banking; this is an alternative 
conceptualisation of shadow banking and a departure from the view that ascribes shadow 
banking to regulatory arbitrage. This demand side perspective instead sees the appetite from 
the global investor community for yield bearing debt securities as the key driver of shadow 
banking (Lysandrou and Nesvetailova, 2015). By enlisting philanthrocapitalists in the global 
FfD initiative through a valorization of ‘patient capital’, investment funds seeking impact 
have prompted an expansion in the production of debt instruments, and thus responded to this 
demand. This second argument therefore draws attention to two aspects of the impact 
investment landscape. One of these is the tendency of impact investors to seek yield; the 
other is the role of intermediation in an originate-to-distribute-model (OTD). The search for 
yield is a feature of what Lysandrou and Nesvetailova (2015) trace back to the relationship 
between the global supply of government and corporate debt securities and the demand for 
these securities, which was roughly balanced up to the 2000s; a gap then appeared when 
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global demand began to outstrip global supply as requirements surged from governments, 
institutional asset managers and HNWIs outside of advanced capitalist economies35. The 
yield seeking aspect pertains mainly to the deployment of impact capital in the form of debt: 
as mentioned earlier, in Pakistan this is the dominant form of impact investment and 
preferred particularly by DFIs.  
The other aspect is that of the OTD, which pertains to equity investments. The shift 
from an originate-to-hold-model (OTH) to an originate-to-distribute-model describes the 
dramatic outcome of new financial technologies and regulations that pushed banks to shed 
their traditional role of intermediation since they were no longer constrained by balance 
sheets. Previously, under OTH, banks would accept deposits in order to grant loans and 
operate on the spread generated. Under OTD, however, the same banks were able to ‘slice 
and dice’ the loans they granted and then to sell the risks associated with these loans to other 
financial market players. This process came to be known as ‘securitization’ (Kessler and 
Wilhelm, 2013; Engelen et al, 2010; Aalbers, 2009; French and Leyshon, 2004) and 
permitted banks to eschew the incentives to control and account for the variety and quality of 
risks they themselves originated (Nesvetailova, 2017). Using an OTD approach, fund 
managers — often subsidiaries of DFIs — are able to originate equity investments to attract 
capital from IFIs, DFIs, and other investment funds, as demonstrated earlier in the examples 
of DFID, USAID, and Norfund. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has argued that impact investing is a means to promote shadow banking — in the 
form of development initiatives — in poor countries. This has been done by showing how 
global financial capital came to occupy a principal function in approaches to capitalist 
philanthropy or philanthrocapitalism: this role came to be institutionalized through initiatives 
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such as the FfD agenda and the adoption of impact investing strategies by private as well as 
non-private institutions, including international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
UNDP. Such approaches to development reflect an influential viewpoint: that development is 
essentially a problem of finance. This viewpoint is invoked regularly in the context of the 
SDGs, and has in the past, informed the pursuit of the MDGs. Within the global agenda of 
FfD, impact investing is of particular interest because similar practices have in the past 
facilitated the deployment of substantial amounts of capital — from public, private, as well as 
philanthropic sources — in poor countries particularly for infrastructural projects. Examples 
of such projects include electricity generation and telecommunications which facilitate the 
growth of scale economies via industrialization.  
Recent examples from impact investing in Pakistan show that the potential to replicate 
such past approaches to development has been limited by the way in which the core features 
of impact investing, measurement and reporting, are designed. Consequently, impact 
investors have, to a large extent, embraced a BoP focus and have thus compromised their 
social impact and left their strategies open to the development critiques of this approach. 
Particularly, the impact investing fixation with inclusive finance — which is itself an 
extension of the financial sector and the subject of several critiques — draws attention to the 
role of shadow banking in development. Financialized development of this nature sees impact 
investors, on one hand, fill a void in enterprise finance which has been created by regulatory 
constraints, and on the other hand accommodating a buoyant demand for financial yield by 
shepherding the entry of global capital into developing markets.  
These observations augment the literature on finance and development and also that 
on shadow banking, particularly outside advanced capitalist economies. As such there is a 
need for critical approaches that seek to identify where the goals of finance and of 
development are indeed in harmony, and where they are in conflict. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The Global Impact Investing Network is a nonprofit organization dedicated to increasing the scale 
and effectiveness of impact investing particularly through research and building infrastructure 
such as measurement and evaluation tools. See https://thegiin.org/  
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2 https://pppknowledgelab.org/  
3 https://www.gihub.org/  
4 Millenium Development Goals (MDGs), and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs): 
http://www.sdgfund.org/mdgs-sdgs  
5 See Eurodad (2017)  
6 See Mustapha et al (2014)  
7 See OECD (2017)  
8 Here the description of shadow banking by Pozsar et al. (2010) of shadow banking as consisting of 
financial intermediaries that conduct maturity, credit, and liquidity transformation without 
explicit access to central bank liquidity or public sector credit guarantees, is relevant. 
9 Other alternative classes may be found under the headers of private equity, energy, infrastructure, 
real estate and credit.  
10 This concept, of a risk-return spectrum or trade-off, is central to Modern Portfolio Theory and is 
attributed to the American economist Harry Markowitz who was awarded a Nobel Prize in 
Economics in 1990.  
11 This characterization is used by the Acumen Fund (2018).  
12 Dots denote non-zero values that have been withheld due to the IRIS anonymity policy. The total 
column does not include these non-zero values.  
13 Examples of this include observations by Susanne Soederberg (2013) on the G20, Ananya Roy 
(2010) on the World Bank, and Philip Mader (2018) on the CGAP.  
14 https://criticalfinance.org/   
15 See Mawdsley (2018)  
16 See World Bank (2017) 
17 http://www.kkr.com/businesses/global-impact 
18 Including Islamic banks 
19 In Pakistan, DFI refers to a bilateral institution established to promote investment into Pakistan and 
to enhance trade flows between Pakistan and the sponsoring country. 
20 Another category of financial institution regulated by the central bank or SBP is that of specialized 
banks which are permitted to lend to specific types of borrowers such as agriculturalists but not 
permitted to carry out other banking activities such as deposit taking. Other financial institutions 
such as leasing companies, mutual funds, and microfinance providers which are non deposit 
taking institutions are regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
(SECP).  
21 This terminology is associated with McKinnon (1973).  
22 Companies in Pakistan that wish to be registered as nonprofit or non governmental oraganisatiaons 
may do so under Section 42 of the 1984 Companies Ordinance: this is the status under which 
Karandaaz operates.  
23 The SPV structure typically used for development programs is based on creating “not–for–profit” 
legal entities, into which development programs can place often large amounts of money to 
implement projects/ objectives (KPMG,2017) 
24 Some lenders could use the funds of depositors for on lending but this option was not widely 
available because of (1) low numbers of depositors/ savers and (2) licensing restrictions on 
which institutions were permitted to accept client deposits.  
25 A number of social enterprises in Pakistan are categorized as NGOs despite operating with 
commercial models. One instance is the Pakistani branch of Hamdard, which became an Islamic 
trust or ‘waqf’ in 1953 and now runs a wide range of organizations and businesses, including a 
university and several laboratories that produce and distribute a wide range of pharmaceuticals at 
highly affordable prices: another instance is the organization known as The Citizen’s 
Foundation, which is a low-cost education provider that has been running schools in various 
poor neighborhoods across Pakistan since the mid-1990s (Ali and Darko, 2015). 
26 https://www.ashoka.org/en-gb/about-ashoka-0 
27 Acumen Fund (2018) 
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28 http://seedventures.org/about-us/vision-mission/  
29 This is the same organization mentioned earlier in this article for its work in Africa, Central 
Asia,and Afghanistan.  
30 http://www.afd.fr/en/pakistan-winds-hope  
31 https://www.proparco.fr/en/engro  
32 https://www.proparco.fr/en/proparco-finances-microfinance-institution-pakistan  
33 http://pmic.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/PACRA-PMIC-PR-Oct17.pdf  
34 Includes other instruments, mainly guarantees. 
35 This occurrence is presented as an ‘exogenous’ explanation for the role of shadow banking in the 
global financial crisis of 2007-9 (Lysandrou and Nesvetailova, 2015). 
